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Global games of regime change–coordination games of incomplete information in which a
status quo is abandoned once a suﬃciently large fraction of agents attacks it–have been used to
study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change.
We extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to take actions
in many periods and to learn about the underlying fundamentals over time. We ﬁrst provide
a simple recursive algorithm for the characterization of monotone equilibria. We then show
how the interaction of the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks with the arrival
of information over time, or with changes in fundamentals, leads to interesting equilibrium
properties. First, multiplicity may obtain under the same conditions on exogenous information
that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark. Second, fundamentals may predict the
eventual regime outcome but not the timing or the number of attacks. Finally, equilibrium
dynamics can alternate between phases of tranquillity–where no attack is possible–and phases
of distress–where a large attack can occur–even without changes in fundamentals.
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Games of regime change are coordination games in which a status quo is abandoned, causing a
discrete change in payoﬀs, once a suﬃciently large number of agents takes an action against it.
These games have been used to model a variety of crises phenomena: an attack against the status
quo is interpreted as speculation against a currency peg, as a run against a bank, or as a revolution
against a dictator.
Most applications of these games to crises have been conﬁned to static frameworks: they
abstract from the possibility that agents take multiple shots against the status quo and that their
beliefs about their ability to induce regime change vary over time.1 Yet, these two possibilities
are important from both an applied and a theoretical perspective. First, crises are intrinsically
dynamic phenomena. In the context of currency crises, for example, speculators can attack a
currency again and again until they induce devaluation; and their expectations about the ability
of the central bank to defend the currency in the present may naturally depend on whether the
bank has successfully defended it in the past. Second, learning in a dynamic setting may critically
aﬀect the level of strategic uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about one another’s actions) and thereby
the dynamics of coordination and the determinacy of equilibria.
In this paper, we consider a dynamic global game that extends the static benchmark used in
the literature so as to incorporate precisely the two possibilities highlighted above.2 There is a
large number of agents and two possible regimes, the status quo and an alternative. The game
continues as long as the status quo is in place. In each period, each agent can either attack the
status quo (i.e., take an action that favors regime change), or not attack. The net payoﬀ from
attacking is positive if the status quo is abandoned in that period and negative otherwise. Regime
change, in turn, occurs if and only if the fraction of agents attacking exceeds a threshold θ ∈ R that
parameterizes the strength of the status quo. θ captures the component of the payoﬀ structure (the
“fundamentals”) that is never common knowledge; as time passes, agents receive more and more
private information about θ.
We ﬁrst provide an algorithm for the characterization of monotone equilibria, based on a simple
recursive structure. A diﬃculty with extending global games to dynamic settings is the need to
keep track of the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of beliefs. Our framework overcomes
this diﬃculty by summarizing the private information of an agent about θ at any given period in a
one-dimensional suﬃcient statistic, and capturing the dynamics of the cross-sectional distribution
1This is particularly true for recent applications that introduce incomplete information. See Morris and Shin
(1998) for currency crises; Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) and Rochet and Vives (2004) for bank runs; Morris and
Shin (2004) and Corsetti, Guimaraes and Roubini (2005) for debt crises; Atkeson (2000) and Edmond (2005) for riots
and political change.
2Global games are incomplete-information games that often admit a unique, iteratively-dominant equilibrium; see
Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (2003). The applications cited in footnote 1 are all based on
one-shot global games.
1of this statistic in a parsimonious way. We then apply this algorithm to examine the eﬀects of
learning on the determinacy of equilibria and the dynamics of coordination.
Multiplicity. We ﬁnd that multiple equilibria can exist in our dynamic game under the
same conditions on the precision of exogenous private and public information that would guarantee
uniqueness in the static benchmark that is the backbone of most recent applications of global
games (Morris and Shin, 1998, 2001, 2003). Multiplicity originates in the interaction between
the endogenous learning induced by the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks and the
exogenous learning induced by the arrival of new private information over time.
Iterated deletion of dominated strategies ensures that equilibrium play is uniquely determined
in the ﬁrst period: an attack necessarily takes place for every θ, but succeeds in triggering regime
change if and only if θ is suﬃciently low. In any subsequent period, the knowledge that the status
quo is still in place makes it common certainty that it is not too weak, and ensures that no agent
ever again ﬁnds it dominant to attack. As a result, there always exists an equilibrium in which no
attack occurs after the ﬁrst period. This would actually be the unique equilibrium of the game if
agents did not receive any information after the ﬁrst period.
When instead new private information about θ arrives over time, this has two eﬀects on pos-
terior beliefs about the strength of the status quo and hence on the agents’ incentives to attack.
On the one hand, it dilutes the upward shift in posterior beliefs induced by the knowledge that
the regime survived the ﬁrst-period attack, which contributes to making further attacks possible.
On the other hand, it reduces the dependence of posterior beliefs on the common prior, which in
general has an ambiguous eﬀect. When the prior mean is high (i.e., favorable to the status quo),
discounting the prior also contributes to making a new attack possible; the opposite is true when
the prior mean is low. A high prior mean thus ensures existence of an equilibrium where a second
attack occurs once private information becomes suﬃciently precise.
More generally, we show that, when the prior mean is suﬃciently high, the arrival of private
information over time suﬃces for the existence of arbitrarily many equilibria, which diﬀer in both
the number and the timing of attacks.
Dynamics of coordination. The multiplicity discussed above does not mean that “anything
goes”: equilibrium outcomes in any given period depend critically on available information and the
history of past play.
The learning induced by the knowledge that the status quo survived past attacks introduces
a form of strategic substitutability across periods: the more aggressive the agents’ strategy in
one period, the higher the threshold in θ below which regime change occurs in that period; but
then the larger the upward shift in posterior beliefs induced by the knowledge that the regime
survived this attack, and hence the lower the incentive to attack in subsequent periods. When an
aggressive attack takes place in one period but fails to trigger regime change, then a signiﬁcant
increase in the precision of private information is necessary to oﬀset the endogenous upward shift in
posterior beliefs and make a new attack possible in equilibrium. As a result, dynamics take the form
2of sequences of periods in which attacks can not occur and agents only accumulate information,
followed by periods in which an attack is possible but does not materialize, eventually resulting in
a new attack.
Moreover, although it is possible that attacks continue indeﬁnitely as long as new information
arrives over time, strategic uncertainty signiﬁcantly limits the size of attacks. For θ high enough,
the status quo may survive forever, independently of which equilibrium is played and despite the
fact that it might have been vulnerable to a suﬃciently strong attack.
Implications for crises. These results translate to interesting predictions for the dynam-
ics of crises. First, fundamentals may determine eventual outcomes—e.g., whether a currency is
devalued—but not the timing and number of attacks. Second, an economy can transit from phases
of “tranquility”, where the unique possible outcome is no attack, to phases of “distress”, where
a signiﬁcant change in outcomes can be triggered by a shift in “market sentiments”. Finally, the
transition from one phase to another can be caused by a small change in information or, in a later
extension, by a small change in fundamentals.
These predictions strike a delicate balance between two alternative views of crises. The ﬁrst
associates crises with multiple self-fulﬁlling equilibria: large and abrupt changes in outcomes are at-
tributed to shifts in “market sentiments” or “animal spirits” (Obstfeld, 1996). The second associates
crises with a discontinuity, or strong non-linearity, in the dependence of the unique equilibrium to
exogenous variables: large and abrupt changes in outcomes are attributed to small changes in fun-
damentals, or in agents’ information (Morris and Shin, 1998, 2001). Our results combine a reﬁned
role for multiple self-fulﬁlling expectations with a certain discontinuity in equilibrium outcomes
with respect to information and fundamentals.
Extensions. The benchmark model focuses on the arrival of private information as the only
exogenous source of change in beliefs. In an extension we show how the analysis can accommo-
date public news about the underlying fundamentals. This only reinforces the multiplicity result.
Moreover, equilibrium dynamics continue to be characterized by phases of tranquility and phases
of distress, but now the transition from one phase to another can be triggered by public news.
The benchmark model also deliberately assumes away the possibility that the critical size of
attack that triggers regime change may vary over time. This permits us to isolate the impact of
changes in information (beliefs), as opposed to changes in fundamentals (payoﬀs), on the dynamics
of coordination. Nevertheless, introducing shocks to fundamentals is important for applications, as
well as for understanding the robustness of our results.
We ﬁrst examine the case in which the shocks are perfectly observable. Shocks then provide an
additional driving force for dynamics: a transition from tranquility to distress may now be triggered
by a deterioration in fundamentals. Moreover, a suﬃciently bad shock can push the economy into
a phase where an attack becomes inevitable—a possibility absent in the benchmark model.
We next consider the case in which the shocks are unobservable (or observed with private noise).
The novel eﬀect is that the uncertainty about the shocks “noises up” the learning induced by the
3knowledge that the regime survived past attacks: whereas in the benchmark model this knowledge
leads to a truncation in the support of posterior beliefs about the strength of the status quo, here
posterior beliefs retain full support over the entire real line. Thus, in contrast to the benchmark
model, agents with very low signals may now ﬁnd it dominant to attack in every period; and,
other things equal, a unique equilibrium outcome may obtain in any given period when private
information in that period is suﬃciently precise. Nevertheless, our results are robust as long as the
noise in learning is small: any equilibrium of the benchmark model is approximated arbitrarily well
by an equilibrium of the game with shocks as the volatility of the shocks vanishes.
Thus, what sustains the multiplicity of equilibria and the structure of dynamics identiﬁed
in this paper is the combination of exogenous changes in information or fundamentals with the
endogenous learning induced by the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks. That in
the benchmark model this learning takes the sharp form of a truncation in the support of beliefs
simpliﬁes the analysis but is not essential for the results. What is essential is that this learning
implies a signiﬁcant change in common beliefs about the strength of the status quo.
Related literature. This paper contributes to the literature on global games by highlighting
the importance of learning for equilibrium determinacy. In this respect, it shares with Angeletos,
Hellwig and Pavan (2006)—which considers the signaling eﬀects of policy interventions in a static
environment—the idea that natural sources of endogenous information may qualify the applicability
of global-game uniqueness results, while at the same time reinforcing the more general point that
information is important for coordination. In our framework this leads to novel predictions that
would have not been possible with either common knowledge or a unique equilibrium.3
The paper also contributes to a small but growing literature on dynamic global games. Morris
and Shin (1999) consider a dynamic model whose stage game is similar to ours, but where the
strength of the status quo follows a random walk and is commonly observed at the end of each
period. This reduces the analysis to a sequence of essentially unrelated static games, each with a
unique equilibrium. Heidhues and Melissas (2006) and Giannitsarou and Toxvaerd (2003) establish
uniqueness results for dynamic global games on the basis of dynamic strategic complementarities.
Dasgupta (2006) examines the role of noisy social learning in a two-period investment model with
irreversible actions. Levin (2001) considers a global game with overlapping generations of players.
Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) and Goldstein (2005) consider models of contagion. Frankel and
Pauzner (2000) examine a dynamic coordination game where uniqueness is obtained by combining
aggregate shocks with idiosyncratic inertia. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) consider a setting in
which speculators become gradually and asymmetrically aware of the mispricing of a ﬁnancial asset.
All these papers feature multi-period coordination problems; but none of them features the form
3Information is endogenized also in Angeletos and Werning (2006), Hellwig, Mukherji and Tsyvinski (2006), and
Tarashev (2005), where ﬁnancial prices aggregate and publicize disperse private information, and in Edmond (2005),
where a dictator manipulates the distribution of private signals.
4of learning that is the center of our analysis.4 Our methodological approach is also quite diﬀerent:
instead of forcing uniqueness, we wish to understand how a natural form of learning sustained by
repeated play may aﬀect both the determinacy of equilibria and the structure of dynamics.
Finally, this paper shares with Chari and Kehoe (2003) the motivation that information is
important for understanding crises: our benchmark model oﬀers a theory where changes in infor-
mation are the sole source for the dynamics of crises. However, there are two important diﬀerences.
First, Chari and Kehoe focus on the eﬀect of herding in an environment without strategic comple-
mentarities. In contrast, we focus on the impact of learning on the dynamics of coordination. The
coordination element is crucial for the prediction that there is a phase of distress during which an
attack is possible but does not necessary take place, as well as for the prediction that attacks occur
as sudden and synchronized events. Second, the main learning eﬀect in Chari and Kehoe is the
negative information about the fundamentals revealed by the choice by some agents to attack—a
form of learning that generates “build-up” or “snow-balling” eﬀects. In contrast, the main learning
eﬀect in our benchmark model is the positive information revealed by the failure of an attack to
trigger regime change—a form of learning that is crucial for our prediction that phases of distress
are eventually followed by phases of tranquility. In Section 5.2 we discuss an extension of our bench-
mark model in which agents observe noisy signals about the size of past attacks. This extension
combines our cycles between phases of distress and tranquility with snow-balling eﬀects similar to
those stressed in the herding literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the static benchmark and
introduces the dynamic model. Section 3 characterizes the set of monotone equilibria. Section 4
establishes the multiplicity result and examines the properties of equilibrium dynamics. Section 5
considers a few extensions of the benchmark model and examines robustness. Section 6 concludes.
Proofs omitted in the main text are in the Appendix.
2 A simple game of regime change
2.1 Static benchmark
Model set-up. There is a continuum of agents of measure one, indexed by i and uniformly
distributed over [0,1]. Agents move simultaneously, choosing between two actions: they can either
attack the status quo (i.e., take an action that favors regime change) or refrain from attacking.
The payoﬀ structure is illustrated in Table 1. The payoﬀ from not attacking (ai = 0) is zero,
whereas the payoﬀ from attacking (ai = 1) is 1−c > 0 if the status quo is abandoned (R = 1) and
−c < 0 otherwise (R = 0), where c ∈ (0,1) parameterizes the relative cost of attacking. An agent
hence ﬁnds it optimal to attack if and only if he expects regime change with probability at least
4Chamley (2003) also considers learning in a dynamic coordination game. However, his model is not a global
game; all information is public, and so is learning.
5equal to c. The status quo, in turn, is abandoned if and only if the measure of agents attacking,
which we denote by A, is no less than a critical value θ ∈ R, which parameterizes the strength
of the status quo. An agent’s incentive to attack thus increases with the aggregate size of attack,
implying that agents’ actions are strategic complements.5
Regime Change (A ≥ θ) Status Quo (A < θ)
Attack (ai = 1) 1 − c −c
Not Attack (ai = 0) 0 0
Table I: Payoﬀs
Agents have heterogeneous information about the strength of the status quo. Nature ﬁrst draws
θ from a normal distribution N (z,1/α), which deﬁnes the initial common prior about θ. Each agent
then receives a private signal xi = θ + ξi, where ξi ∼ N (0,1/β) is noise, i.i.d. across agents and
independent of θ. The Normality assumptions allow us to parameterize the information structure
parsimoniously with (β,α,z), that is, the precision of private information and the precision and
the mean of the common prior.
Interpretation. Although the game presented above is highly stylized, it admits a variety
of interpretations and possible applications. The most celebrated examples are self-fulﬁlling bank
runs, currency attacks, and debt crises. In these contexts, regime change occurs, respectively,
when a large run forces the banking system to suspend its payments, when a large speculative
attack forces the central bank to abandon the peg, or when a country/company fails to coordinate
its creditors to roll over its debt and is hence forced into bankruptcy. The model can also be
interpreted as one of political change, in which a large number of citizens decide whether or not to
take actions to subvert a repressive dictator or some other political establishment. (For references,
see footnote 1.)
Equilibrium analysis. Note that the c.d.f. of an agent’s posterior about θ is decreasing in
his private signal x. Moreover, it is strictly dominant to attack for suﬃciently low signals (namely
for x < x, where x solves Pr(θ ≤ 0|x) = c) and not to attack for suﬃcient high signals (namely
for x > ¯ x,where ¯ x solves Pr(θ ≤ 1|¯ x) = c). It is thus natural to look at monotone Bayesian Nash
equilibria in which the agents’ strategy is non-increasing in x.
Indeed, suppose there is a threshold ˆ x ∈ R such that each agent attacks if and only if x ≤ ˆ x.
The measure of agents attacking is then decreasing in θ and is given by
A(θ) = Pr(x ≤ ˆ x|θ) = Φ(
 
β(ˆ x − θ)),
5The role of coordination is most evident when θ is commonly known by all agents: for θ ∈ (0,1], there exist two
pure-strategy equilibria, one in which all agents attack and the status quo is abandoned (A = 1 ≥ θ) and another in
which no agent attacks and the status quo is maintained (A = 0 < θ).
6where Φ is the c.d.f. of the standard Normal. It follows that the status quo is abandoned if and
only if θ ≤ ˆ θ, where ˆ θ solves ˆ θ = A(ˆ θ), or equivalently
ˆ θ = Φ(
 
β(ˆ x − ˆ θ)). (1)




β+αz and precision β + α. It follows that the posterior probability of regime
change is simply






β+αz − ˆ θ
  
.
Since the latter is decreasing in x, an agent ﬁnds it optimal to attack if and only if x ≤ ˆ x, where ˆ x






β+αˆ x + α
β+αz − ˆ θ
  
= c. (2)
A monotone equilibrium is thus identiﬁed by a joint solution (ˆ x, ˆ θ) to (1) and (2). Such a solution
always exists and is unique for all z if and only if β ≥ α2/(2π). Moreover, iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies implies that, when the monotone equilibrium is unique, there is no
other equilibrium.
Proposition 1 In the static game, the equilibrium is unique if and only if β ≥ α2/(2π), and is in
monotone strategies.
In the limit as β → ∞ for given α, the threshold ˆ θ converges to θ∞ ≡ 1 − c, and the size of
attack A(θ) converges to 1 for all θ < θ∞ and to 0 for all θ > θ∞. Hence, when the noise in private
information is small and θ is in the neighborhood of θ∞, a small variation in θ can trigger a large
variation in the size of attack and in the regime outcome. This kind of discontinuity, or strong
non-linearity, in the response of equilibrium outcomes to exogenous variables underlies the view of
crises advocated by most global-game applications.6
2.2 Dynamic game
We modify the static game reviewed above in two ways: ﬁrst, we allow agents to attack the status
quo repeatedly; second, we let agents accumulate information over time.
Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ {1,2,...}. The game continues as long as the status quo
is in place and is over once the status quo is abandoned. We denote by Rt = 0 the event that the
status quo is in place at the beginning of period t, by Rt = 1 the alternative event, by ait ∈ {0,1}
the action of agent i, and by At ∈ [0,1] the measure of agents attacking at date t. Conditional on
6A related strong non-linearity emerges in the response of equilibrium outcomes to noise in public information;
see the discussion of the “publicity multiplier” in Morris and Shin (2003) and that of “non-fundamental volatility”
in Angeletos and Werning (2005).
7the regime being in place at the beginning of period t (Rt = 0), the regime is abandoned in that
period (Rt+1 = 1) if and only if At ≥ θ, where θ again represents the strength of the status quo.
Agent i’s ﬂow payoﬀ for period t (conditional on Rt = 0) is thus πit = ait (Rt+1 − c), while his
payoﬀ from the entire game is Πi =
 ∞
t=1 ρt−1(1 − Rt)πit, where ρ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor.
Like in the static model, θ is drawn at the beginning of the game from N (z,1/α), which deﬁnes
the initial common prior, and never becomes common knowledge. Private information, however,
evolves over time. In each period t ≥ 1, every agent i receives a private signal ˜ xit = θ + ξit
about θ, where ξit ∼ N (0,1/ηt) is i.i.d. across i, independent of θ, and serially uncorrelated. Let
˜ xt
i = {˜ xiτ}t
τ=1 denote agent i’s history of private signals up to period t. Individual actions and the
size of past attacks are not observable, hence the public history in period t simply consists of the
information that the regime is still in place, whereas the private history of an agent is the sequence
of own private signals and own past actions. Finally, we let βt ≡
 t
τ=1 ητ and assume that
∞ > βt ≥ α2/(2π) ∀t and lim
t→∞
βt = ∞.
As shown in the next section, βt parameterizes the precision of private information accumulated
up to period t. The assumptions we make here for βt ensure (i) that the static game deﬁned by the
restriction that agents can move only in period t has a unique equilibrium for every t, and (ii) that
private information becomes inﬁnitely precise only in the limit.
Remark. While this dynamic game is highly stylized, it captures two important dimensions
that are absent in the static benchmark: ﬁrst, the possibility of multiple attacks against the status
quo; and, second, the evolution of beliefs about the strength of the status quo. By assuming that
per-period payoﬀs do not depend on past or future actions and by ignoring speciﬁc institutional
details, the model may of course fail to capture other interesting eﬀects introduced by dynamics,
such as, for example, the role of wealth accumulation or liquidity in currency crises. However,
abstracting from these other dimensions allows us to isolate information as the driving force for the
dynamics of coordination and crises.
Equilibrium. In what follows, we limit attention to monotone equilibria, that is, symmetric
Perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the probability an agent attacks in period t, which we denote
by at(˜ xt), is non-increasing in his private signals ˜ xt and independent of his own past actions.7
Restricting attention to this class of equilibria suﬃces to establish our results.
3 Equilibrium characterization
Let at : Rt → [0,1] denote the strategy for period t and at = {aτ}t
τ=1 the strategy up to period t,
with a∞ = {aτ}∞
τ=1 denoting the complete strategy for the dynamic game. Since ˜ xt is i.i.d. across
agents conditional on θ, for any given strategy a∞ the size of attack and the regime outcome in
period t depend only on θ. Thus let pt(θ;at) denote the probability that the status quo is abandoned
7We do not restrict the set of available strategies: we look at equilibria in which these properties are satisﬁed.
8in period t when all agents follow the strategy at, conditional on the status quo being in place at the
beginning of period t and the fundamentals being θ. Finally, let Ψ1(θ|˜ x1) denote the c.d.f. of the
posterior beliefs in period 1, while for any t ≥ 2 let Ψt(θ|˜ xt;at−1) denote the c.d.f. of the posterior
beliefs in period t conditional on the knowledge that the status quo is still in place (i.e., Rt = 0)
and that agents have played in past periods according to at−1.
Since neither individual nor aggregate actions are observable, and Rt = 0 is always compatible
with any strategy proﬁle at any t, no agent can detect out-of-equilibrium play as long as the status
quo is in place.8 It follows that beliefs are pinned down by Bayes’ rule in any relevant history of
the game. Furthermore, as long as the status quo is in place, payoﬀs in one period do not depend
on own or other players’ actions in any other period, and hence strategies are sequentially rational
if and only if the action prescribed for any given period maximizes the payoﬀ for that period. We
conclude that the strategy a∞ = {at}
∞
t=1 is part of an equilibrium if and only if the following hold:
at t = 1, for all ˜ x1,
a1(˜ x1) ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
   





and at any t ≥ 2, for all ˜ xt,
at(˜ xt) ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
   












˜ xt and βt = βt−1 + ηt.
with x1 = ˜ x1 and β1 = η1. By standard Gaussian updating, the distribution of θ conditional on
˜ xt = {˜ xτ}t
τ=1 is Normal with mean
βt
α+βtxt + α
α+βtz and precision βt + α. It follows that xt is a
suﬃcient statistic for ˜ xt with respect to θ, and hence with respect to the event of regime change
as well. As we show below (and further discuss in Section 5.5), this ability to summarize private
information into a one-dimensional suﬃcient statistic greatly simpliﬁes the analysis.
Clearly, condition (3) implies that in any equilibrium of the dynamic game agents play in
the ﬁrst period exactly as in the static game in which they can attack only at t = 1. Hence, by
Proposition 1, equilibrium play is uniquely determined in the ﬁrst period and is characterized in
terms of thresholds for x1 and θ. The following lemma shows that a similar property holds for
subsequent periods.9




t ∈ R ∪
{−∞}, θ∗
t ∈ (0,1), and θ∗
t ≥ θ∗
t−1 for all t ≥ 2, such that:
(i) at any t ≥ 1, an agent attacks if xt < x∗
t and does not attack if xt > x∗
t;
(ii) the status quo is in place in period t ≥ 2 if and only if θ > θ∗
t−1.
8Indeed, the regime always survives any attack for θ > 1 and no realization of the private signal rules out θ > 1.
9To simplify the notation, we allow for x
∗
t = −∞ and x
∗
t = +∞, with which we denote the case where an agent
attacks for, respectively, none and every realization of his private information.
9Proof. We prove the claim by induction. For t = 1, the result follows from Proposition 1.
Consider next any t ≥ 2 and suppose that the result holds for any τ ≤ t − 1. Since at is non-
increasing in ˜ xt, the size of attack At (θ) is non-increasing in θ, implying that either At (θ) < θ (and
therefore Rt+1 = 0) for all θ > θ∗
t−1, in which case θ∗
t = θ∗
t−1, or there exists θ∗
t > θ∗
t−1 such that
At(θ) < θ if and only if θ > θ∗
t. In the former case, the posterior probability of regime change is 0
for all xt and hence x∗
t = −∞. In the latter, the posterior probability of regime change is given by
 






















  ; (5)
and since this is continuous and strictly decreasing in xt, and converges to 1 as xt → −∞ and
to 0 as xt → +∞, there exists x∗
t ∈ R such that Pr(θ ≤ θ∗
t|xt,θ > θ∗




t−1) > c for xt < x∗
t and Pr(θ ≤ θ∗
t|xt,θ > θ∗
t−1) < c for xt > x∗
t. In either case,
At (θ) < 1 for all θ and hence θ∗
t < 1, which together with θ∗
t ≥ θ∗
1 > 0, implies that θ∗
t ∈ (0,1) for
all t, which completes the proof.
Clearly, since the status quo can not be in place in one period without also being in place
in the previous, the sequence {θ∗
t} is non-decreasing. On the other hand, the sequence {x∗
t} is
non-monotonic in general: periods where some agents attack (x∗
t > −∞) may indeﬁnitely alternate
with periods where nobody attacks (x∗
t = −∞).
As mentioned above, the ﬁrst period in our dynamic game is similar to the static game; but
any subsequent period is very diﬀerent. In any t ≥ 2, the fact that the status quo is still in place
makes it common certainty that θ > θ∗
t−1.10 Since θ∗
t−1 ≥ θ∗
1 > 0, this immediately implies that
there always exist equilibria in which nobody attacks in period t ≥ 2 (in which case x∗
t = −∞ and
θ∗
t = θ∗
t−1). In particular, there exists an equilibrium in which an attack takes place in period one
and never thereafter. If this were the unique equilibrium, the possibility to take repeated actions
against the regime would add nothing to the static analysis and the equilibrium outcome in the
dynamic game would coincide with that in the static benchmark. In what follows we thus examine
under what conditions there also exist equilibria with further attacks.
Lemma 1 rules out x∗
t = +∞ (situations where everybody attacks). This follows directly from
the fact that the status quo always survives for θ > 1 and hence it is dominant not to attack for xt
suﬃciently high. We thus look for equilibria in which x∗
t ∈ R.




t − θt)), which is con-
tinuous and strictly decreasing in θ, while the probability of regime change for an agent with
10Clearly, the knowledge that the regime is in place in period t is a form of public information. However, this is
very diﬀerent from the type of information conveyed by additive public signals of θ (Morris and Shin, 2001, 2003;
Hellwig, 2002). First, the information here is endogenous, as it depends on the particular equilibrium being played;
and second, it leads to a ﬁrst-order stochastic-dominance shift in beliefs. We introduce additive public signals about
θ in Section 5.1.
10statistic xt is given by (5), which is continuous and strictly decreasing in xt if θ∗
t > θ∗
t−1. It follows







































   = c. (7)
Conditions (6) and (7) are the analogs in the dynamic game of conditions (1) and (2) in the static
game: (6) states that the equilibrium size of an attack is equal to the critical size that triggers
regime change if and only if the fundamentals are θ∗
t, while (7) states that an agent is indiﬀerent
between attacking and not attacking if and only if his private information is x∗
t.
An alternative representation of the equilibrium conditions is also useful. Deﬁne the functions
u : R×[0,1]×R×R2

































￿ − c if θ∗ > θ∗
−1
−c if θ∗ ≤ θ∗
−1
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is the net payoﬀ from attacking
in period t for an agent with statistic xt when it is known that θ > θ∗
−1 and that regime change
will occur if and only if θ ≤ θ∗; X (θ∗,βt) is the threshold x∗ such that, if agents attack in period





is the net payoﬀ
from attacking for the “marginal agent” with signal x∗ = X (θ∗,βt) when it is known that θ > θ∗
−1.
Next, solving (6) for x∗
t gives x∗
t = X (θ∗








which represents the indiﬀerence condition for the marginal agent in period t, for t ≥ 2. As for t = 1,
since the regime has never been challenged in the past, the corresponding indiﬀerence condition is
U (θ∗
1,−∞,β1,α,z) = 0; clearly, U (θ,−∞,β,α,z) coincides with the payoﬀ of the marginal agent
in the static benchmark.
We can thus characterize the set of monotone equilibria as follows.
11With a slight abuse of notation, we let Φ(+∞) = 1, Φ(−∞) = 0, Φ
−1(1) = +∞ and Φ
−1(0) = −∞.
11Proposition 2 {at ( )}∞





(i) for all t, at ( ) = 1 if xt < x∗
t and at ( ) = 0 if xt > x∗
t.
(ii) for t = 1, θ∗
1 solves U (θ∗
1,−∞,β1,α,z) = 0 and x∗
1 = X(θ∗
1,β1).
(iii) for any t ≥ 2, either θ∗
t = θ∗
t−1 > 0 and x∗
t = −∞, or θ∗
t > θ∗







= 0 and x∗
t = X(θ∗
t,βt).
A monotone equilibrium always exists.
Proposition 2 provides a simple algorithm for constructing the entire set of monotone equilibria:
ﬁrst, start with t = 1 and let θ∗
1 be the unique solution to U (θ∗
1,−∞,β1,α,z) = 0; next, proceed to
period t = 2; if U (θ∗
2,θ∗
1,β2,α,z) = 0 admits no solution, set θ∗
2 = θ∗
1; if it admits a solution, either
let θ∗
2 be such a solution, or simply set θ∗
2 = θ∗
1; ﬁnally, repeat for all t ≥ 3 the same step as for
t = 2. The set of sequences {θ∗
t}
∞




t=1 , gives the set of monotone equilibria.
This recursive algorithm is based on the property that equilibrium learning takes the simple
form of a truncation in the support of beliefs about θ : the knowledge that the regime has survived
past attacks simply translates into the knowledge that θ is above a threshold θ∗
t−1. In Section 5 we
examine how this property may, or may not, extend to richer environments. Note also that the
above characterization is independent of whether the horizon is ﬁnite or inﬁnite: it is clearly valid
even if the game ends exogenously at an arbitrary period T < ∞.
Existence of at least one monotone equilibrium follows immediately from the fact that the
equation U (θ∗
1,−∞,β1,α,z) = 0 always admits a solution, and θ∗
t = θ∗
1 for all t is always an equi-
librium. To understand whether there are other monotone equilibria, the next lemma investigates
the properties of U and the existence of solutions to condition (8).





is continuous in all its arguments, non-monotonic in θ∗ when
θ∗
−1 ∈ (0,1), and strictly decreasing in θ∗
−1 and z for θ∗
−1 < θ∗. Furthermore, for all θ∗







= θ∞ − θ∗, where θ∞ ≡ 1 − c.
(ii) Let ˆ θt be the unique solution to U(ˆ θt,−∞,βt,α,z) = 0. A solution to (8) exists only if
θ∗
t−1 < ˆ θt and is necessarily bounded from above by ˆ θt.
(iii) If θ∗
t−1 > θ∞, a solution to (8) does not exist for βt suﬃciently high.
(iv) If θ∗
t−1 < θ∞, a solution to (8) necessarily exists for βt suﬃciently high.
(v) If θ∗
t−1 is the highest solution to (8) for period t − 1, there exists β > βt−1 such that (8)
admits no solution for any period τ ≥ t such that βτ < β.





is non-monotonic in θ∗ whenever θ∗
−1 ∈ (0,1), recall that the
higher θ∗, the higher the threshold x∗ = X (θ∗,βt) such that, if agents attack in period t if and only
if xt ≤ x∗, then At (θ) ≥ θ if and only if θ ≤ θ∗. When θ∗ < θ∗
−1, the threshold x∗ is so low that the
size of attack is smaller than θ for all θ > θ∗
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Figure 1: The payoﬀ of the marginal agent.





= −c for θ∗ < θ∗
−1. When instead θ∗ > θ∗
−1,
the threshold x∗ is high enough that regime change occurs for a positive measure of θ > θ∗
−1;






> −c for θ∗ > θ∗
−1. Finally, when θ∗ → 1, x∗ → ∞ and hence the probability that
the marginal agent attaches to the event that θ > 1 converges to 1; but then the probability he





→ −c as θ∗ → 1.
We thus have that U is ﬂat at −c for θ∗ < θ∗
−1, it then increases with θ∗ and eventually
decreases with θ∗ and converges again to −c as θ∗ → 1. This is illustrated by the solid curve in
Figure 1. Any intersection of this curve with the horizontal axis corresponds to a solution to (8).12
The dashed line instead represents the payoﬀ of the marginal agent in the static game in which
agents can attack only in period t; when βt is suﬃciently high, this is monotonic in θ∗. While
the monotonicity of the payoﬀ of the marginal agent in the static game ensures uniqueness, the
non-monotonicity in the dynamic game leaves open the possibility for multiple equilibria.
Next, to understand why U decreases with z, note that an increase in the prior mean implies
a ﬁrst-order stochastic-dominance change in posterior beliefs about θ : the higher z, the lower the
probability of regime change for any given monotone strategy, and hence the lower the net payoﬀ
from attacking for the marginal agent.
Similarly, since an increase in θ∗
−1 also corresponds to an upward shift in posterior beliefs
12It can be shown that U (θ
∗,θ
∗
−1,·) is single-peaked in θ
∗ when θ
∗
−1 ≥ 1/2. Numerical simulations suggest that
this is true even when θ
∗
−1 < 1/2, although we have not been able to prove it. Single-peakedness of U implies that
(8) admits at most two solutions (generically none or two). When there are two solutions, as in the case of the
solid line in Figure 1, the lowest one corresponds to an unstable equilibrium, while the highest one corresponds to




−1 ∈ (0,1), with a ﬁnite number of stationary points.
13about θ, U also decreases with θ∗
−1. This implies that, at any t ≥ 2, the payoﬀ of the marginal
agent is always lower than U (θ∗,−∞,βt,α,z), that is, than the payoﬀ in the static game where
the precision of private information is βt. This in turn explains why the static-game threshold ˆ θt
(which corresponds to the intersection of the dashed line with the horizontal axis in Figure 1) is an
upper bound for any solution to (8).
To understand (iii) and (iv), note that as βt → ∞ the impact on posterior beliefs of the
knowledge that θ > θ∗
t−1 vanishes for any xt > θ∗






and U(θ∗,−∞,βt,α,z) also vanishes for any θ∗ > θ∗
t−1. Combined
with the fact that U(θ∗,−∞,βt,α,z) → θ∞ − θ∗ as βt → ∞, this implies that, for βt suﬃciently
high, (8) necessarily admits at least one solution if θ∗
t−1 < θ∞, and no solution if θ∗
t−1 > θ∞, where
θ∞ = limt→∞ ˆ θt is the limit of the equilibrium threshold in the static game for β → ∞.
Finally, to understand (v), suppose that the largest possible attack (that is, the one correspond-
ing to the highest solution to (8)) is played in one period and is unsuccessful. Then the upward
shift in posterior beliefs induced by the observation that the status quo survived the attack is such
that, if no new information arrives, no further attack is possible in any subsequent period. By
continuity then, further attacks remain impossible as long as the change in the precision of private
information is not large enough.
4 Multiplicity and dynamics
Part (v) of Lemma 2 highlights that the arrival of new private information is necessary for further
attacks to become possible after period 1. Whether this is also suﬃcient depends on the prior
mean, as anticipated in the Introduction.
When z is suﬃciently low (“aggressive prior”), discounting the prior contributes to less aggres-
sive behavior in the sense that ˆ θt decreases with βt and hence ˆ θt < ˆ θ1 for all t ≥ 2. It follows that
an agent who is aware of the fact that the regime survived period one (i.e., that θ > ˆ θ1) would
not be willing to attack in any period t ≥ 2 if he expected all other agents to play as if no attack
occurred prior to period t (i.e., as in the equilibrium of the static game where attacking is allowed
only in period t). The anticipation that other agents will also take into account the fact that the
regime survived past attacks then makes that agent even less willing to attack. Therefore, when z
is low, the game has a unique equilibrium, with no attack occurring after the ﬁrst period.
When, instead, z is suﬃciently high (“lenient prior”), discounting the prior contributes to more
aggressive behavior in the sense that ˆ θt increases with βt. This eﬀect can oﬀset the incentive not
to attack induced by the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks, making new attacks
eventually possible. Indeed, Lemma 2 implies that, when θ∗
1 < θ∞ (which is the case for z high
enough), a second attack necessarily becomes possible once βt is large enough. Such an example is
illustrated in Figure 2. The dashed line represents the payoﬀ of the marginal agent in period 1. Its
intersection with the horizontal axis deﬁnes θ∗
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Figure 2: Equilibria with multiple attacks.
is represented by the dotted line, and that in period 3 by the solid line. Clearly, β2 is low enough
that no attack is possible in period 2. In contrast, β3 is high enough that a new attack is possible.
Thus, there exist at least three equilibria in this example: one in which θ∗
t = θ∗









3 for all t ≥ 3,
where θ′
3 and θ′′
3 correspond to the two intersections of the solid line with the horizontal axis.
In the example of Figure 2, both θ′
3 and θ′′
3 are lower than θ∞. By Lemma 2, then, a third
attack also becomes possible at some future date. More generally, if z is suﬃciently high, any
solution to (8) is strictly less than θ∞ in all periods, which ensures that a new attack eventually
becomes possible after any unsuccessful one. Hence, for z suﬃciently high, not only there are
multiple equilibria, but any arbitrary number of attacks can be sustained in equilibrium.
Theorem 1 There exist thresholds z ≤ z ≤ z such that:
(i) If z ≤ z, there is a unique monotone equilibrium and is such that an attack occurs only in
period one.
(ii) If z ∈ (z,z), there are at most ﬁnitely many monotone equilibria and there exists ¯ t < ∞
such that in any of these equilibria, no attack occurs after period ¯ t.
(iii) If z > z, there are inﬁnitely many equilibria; if in addition z > z, for any t and N, there
is an equilibrium in which N attacks occur after period t.
Finally, z = z = z when c ≤ 1/2, whereas z ≤ z < z when c > 1/2.
Proof. Recall that θ∗
1 = ˆ θ1 and, for all t ≥ 2, θ∗
t < ˆ θt, where ˆ θt = ˆ θ (βt,α,z) is the unique
solution to U(ˆ θ,−∞,βt,α,z) = 0. As proved in Lemma A1 in the Appendix, there exist thresholds
z ≤ z ≤ z (possibly functions of β1 and α) with the following properties: ˆ θt ≤ ˆ θ1 for all t if z ≤ z;
ˆ θ1 ≤ (≥)θ∞ if and only z ≥ (≤)z; and ˆ θt < θ∞ for all t if and only if z > z.
15(i) Consider ﬁrst z ≤ z. Then, ˆ θt ≤ ˆ θ1 = θ∗
1 for all t, and hence, by part (ii) of Lemma 2, (8)
admits no solution at any t ≥ 2. The unique monotone equilibrium is thus θ∗
t = θ∗
1 for all t.
(ii) Next, consider z ∈ (z,z), in which case ˆ θ1 = θ∗
1 > θ∞, but we can not rule out the possibility
that there exists a period t ≥ 2 such that ˆ θt > ˆ θ1 and U (θ∗,θ∗
1,βt,α,z) = 0 admits a solution.
Nevertheless, since θ∗
t−1 ≥ θ∗
1 > θ∞ for all t, by part (iii) of Lemma 2 and the fact that βt → ∞ as
t → ∞, there exists ¯ t < ∞ such that (8) admits no solution for t ≥ ¯ t. Moreover, since (8) admits
at most ﬁnitely many solutions for any t < ¯ t, there are at most ﬁnitely many monotone equilibria,
and in any such equilibrium no attack occurs after period ¯ t.
(iii) Finally, consider z > z, in which case θ∗
1 < θ∞. Then, by part (iv) of Lemma 2, there
exists a t′ < ∞ such that U (θ∗,θ∗
1,βt,α,z) = 0 admits a solution for all t ≥ t′. Hence, for any
t ≥ t′, there is a monotone equilibrium in which θ∗
τ = θ∗
1 for τ < t, θ∗





t for all τ > t. That is, there exist (countably) inﬁnitely many equilibria, indexed by the
time at which the second attack occurs.
When z ∈ (z,z), the second attack may lead to a threshold θ∗
t > θ∞, in which case a third
attack might be impossible. If however z > z, then ˆ θt < θ∞ for all t, and hence by part (ii) of
Lemma 2, θ∗
t < θ∞, for all t. But then by part (iv), a new attack eventually becomes possible after
any unsuccessful one. It follows that, for any t ≥ 1 and any N ≥ 1, there exist increasing sequences
{t2,...,tN} and {θ2,...,θN}, with t2 ≥ t, such that U (θ2,θ∗
1,βt2,α,z) = 0, U (θ3,θ2,βt3,α,z) = 0,
and so on. The following is then an equilibrium: θ∗
τ = θ∗
1 for τ < t2, θ∗
τ = θj for τ ∈ {tj,...,tj+1−1}
and j ∈ {2,...,N − 1}, and θ∗
τ = θN for τ ≥ tN. That is, for any t ≥ 1 and any N ≥ 1, there exists
an equilibrium in which N attacks occur after period t.
The existence of inﬁnitely many equilibria in the case z > z relies on the assumption that
the game continues forever as long as the status quo is in place: if the game ended for exogenous
reasons at a ﬁnite date, there would exist only ﬁnitely many equilibria. Nevertheless, as long as
z > z and βt → ∞ as t → ∞, then, for any M, there exists a ﬁnite T such that the game would
have at least M equilibria if it ended at date T. Moreover, even when T = 2, the game has multiple
equilibria if β2 is suﬃciently high and z > z.
In the remainder of this section, we identify equilibrium properties that seem useful in under-
standing the dynamics of crises.
Corollary 1 Suppose θ > θ∞ and z > z. The status quo survives in any monotone equilibrium.
Nevertheless, there exists t < ∞ such that, at any t ≥ t, an attack can occur, yet does not necessarily
take place. Furthermore, any arbitrary number of attacks is possible.
This seems to square well with the common view that economic fundamentals may help predict
eventual outcomes (e.g., whether a currency is eventually devalued) but not when a crisis will
occur or whether attacks will cease. On the contrary, this view is inconsistent with the common-
knowledge version of the model, in which fundamentals fail to predict both the timing of attacks
16and the eventual regime outcome whenever they are inside the critical region. It is also inconsistent
with unique-equilibrium models like Morris and Shin (1999), in which both the timing of attacks
and the ultimate fate of the regime are uniquely pinned down by the fundamentals.
Consider now how the dynamics of attacks depend on the dynamics of information.
Corollary 2 After the most aggressive attack for a given period occurs, the game enters a phase
of tranquillity, during which no attack is possible. This phase is longer the slower the arrival of
private information.
Along with the property that for θ > θ∞ and z > z a new attack eventually becomes possible
after any unsuccessful one, the above result implies that dynamics may take the form of cycles in
which the economy alternates from phases of tranquillity to phases of distress, eventually resulting
into a new attack, without any change in the underlying fundamentals. Once again, this would
not have been possible in our framework if θ were common knowledge, or if there were a unique
equilibrium.13
Also note that the set of equilibrium outcomes in any given period exhibits a discontinuity
with respect to the precision of private information in that period: a transition from a phase of
tranquility, where nobody attacking is the unique equilibrium outcome, to a phase of distress, where
the size of attack associated with any solution of (8) is bounded away from zero, can be triggered
by a small change in βt. As we will see in Section 5.3, a similar discontinuity emerges with respect
to shocks that aﬀect the strength of the status quo: a transition from one phase to another can
then be triggered by an arbitrarily small change in fundamentals (that is, in payoﬀs).
Finally, note that these results raise some interesting possibilities for policy in the context of
currency crises. On the one hand, since an increase in c shifts U downwards, a central bank might
be able to prevent a transition from a phase of tranquility to a phase of distress—and thus eliminate
the risk of a speculative attack—by raising interest rates, or otherwise increasing the opportunity
cost of attacking, up to the point that the (8) admits no solution. On the other hand, the level
of policy intervention required to achieve this may increase over time as speculators become more
informed about the underlying fundamentals, and may eventually become prohibitively expensive.
Thus an interesting possibility is that certain defense policies succeed in postponing but not in
escaping a crisis.14
13Broner (2005) considers a model that combines a common-knowledge coordination problem ` a la Obstfeld (1996)
with a negative trend in fundamentals ` a la Krugman (1979). The ﬁrst feature delivers multiplicity, while the second
ensures that devaluation is eventually inevitable for exogenous reasons. His analysis thus shares with ours the property
that it may be easier to predict the eventual outcome than the timing of attacks; but it does not share our predictions
about the repeated succession of phases of tranquility and phases of distress, nor our focus on changes in information,
rather than changes in fundamentals, as the source of dynamics.
14Another possibility is that such defense measures themselves convey valuable information; Angeletos, Hellwig
and Pavan (2006) examine such signaling eﬀects in a static global game.
175 Extensions
In this section, we consider a few extensions of the benchmark model. The purpose of these
extensions is to show how the analysis can accommodate additional elements which the benchmark
model has deliberately abstracted from, but which can be relevant for applications. At the same
time, these extensions show robustness to alternative information assumptions and further clarify
the driving forces behind our results.
5.1 Public news
To capture the eﬀect of public news, we now modify the game as follows. In addition to their private
signals, agents observe in each period t ≥ 1 a public signal ˜ zt = θ + εt, where εt is common noise,
normally distributed with zero mean and precision ηz
t > 0, serially uncorrelated, and independent
of θ and the noise in the agents’ private information. These signals may represent, for example, the
information generated by news in the media, publication of government statistics, or announcements
by policy makers. We also allow for the possibility that the game ends for exogenous reasons at a
ﬁnite date and denote the horizon of the game with T, where T ∈ {2,3,...} or T = ∞.
The common posterior about θ conditional on ˜ zt ≡ {˜ zτ}t









˜ zt, αt = αt−1 + ηz
t,
with (z0,α0) = (z,α). However, since equilibrium play in past periods now depends on the re-
alizations of past public signals, zt is not a suﬃcient statistic conditional on the event that the
regime is still in place. We thus allow agents to condition their actions on the entire sequence ˜ zt,
or equivalently on zt ≡ {zτ}t
τ=1. Apart from this modiﬁcation, the set of monotone equilibria can
be constructed following the same algorithm as in the benchmark model.
Proposition 3 In the game with public signals, {at ( )}T
t=0 is a monotone equilibrium if and only




t=1 , with x∗
t : Rt → Rand θ∗
t : Rt → (0,1), such that:









(ii) at t = 1, θ∗
1 (z1) solves U (θ∗
1,−∞,β1,α1,z1) = 0 and x∗
1 (z1) = X(θ∗
1 (z1),β1);

































As in the benchmark model without public signals, there always exist equilibria in which attacks
cease after any arbitrary period. However, since for any θ∗
t−1(zt−1),βt,αt, (9) admits a solution if





is always ﬁnite, there also exist equilibria in which
an attack occurs in period t for suﬃciently low realizations of zt, which proves the following.
18Theorem 2 In the game with public signals, there always exist multiple equilibria.
This result extends and reinforces Theorem 1: multiplicity now emerges no matter the mean
z of the prior, the precisions {βt,αt}
T
t=1 of private and public information, and the horizon T
of the game. This stronger version of multiplicity relies on the combination of two properties:
that suﬃciently low realizations of zt make an attack possible in every period; and that the lower
dominance region is eliminated in all periods t ≥ 2 so that no attack also remains possible in every
period after the ﬁrst one.
Consider now how the introduction of public news aﬀects the ability of an “econometrician”
to predict the regime outcome and/or the occurrence of an attack in any given period. For any t,
any θ ∈ (0,1), and any θ∗
t−1(zt−1) < θ, condition (9) admits a solution higher than θ if and only if
zt is low enough, implying that, conditional on θ, the probability that the status quo is abandoned
in any given period is strictly between 0 and 1. It follows that an econometrician who can observe
θ but can not observe zt, necessarily faces uncertainty about the event of regime change. On the
other hand, if he also knows zt, he may be able to predict the regime outcome in a given period
for some combinations of θ and zt, without, however, being able to predict whether an attack will
occur or not. For example, take any t ≥ 2, let θ1 (z1) and ¯ θt
 
zt 
be the lowest and the highest
solutions to U (θ∗,−∞,β1,α1,z1) = 0 and U (θ∗,θ1 (z1),βt,αt,zt) = 0, respectively, and assume
that θ > ¯ θt
 
zt 
> θ1 (z1). There is no equilibrium in which the status is abandoned in period t,
but there exist both an equilibrium in which an attack occurs and one in which no attack takes
place in that period.15 Therefore, the combination of fundamentals and public information may
help predict regime outcomes but not the occurrence of attacks, as in the benchmark model.
Also note that the threshold ¯ zt, below which (9) admits a solution, decreases with θ∗
t−1. Hence,
an unsuccessful attack, other things equal, causes a discrete increase in the probability that the game
enters a phase during which no attack is possible. In this sense, the prediction of the benchmark
model that equilibrium dynamics are characterized by the alternation of phases of tranquility and
phases of distress survives the introduction of public news; the novelty is that the transition from
one phase to another is now stochastic, as it depends on the realization of zt.
5.2 Signals about past attacks
In the analysis so far, agents learn from the outcome of past attacks but receive no information
about the size of these attacks. For many applications, however, it seems natural to allow agents
to observe noisy private and/or public signals about the size of past attacks.
In the online Supplementary Material we show how this can be done without any sacriﬁce in

























> θ1 (z1), there is no equilibrium in which the regime is abandon in
period t. On the other hand, since U (θ
∗,θ1 (z1),βt,αt,zt) = 0 admits a solution θ





> θ1 (z1), there exists
an equilibrium in which the second attack occurs exactly in period t.
19tractability. The key is to maintain the Normality of the information structure. The algorithm
for monotone equilibria then remains the same as in Proposition 3, except for the fact that the
sequence {βt,αt}∞
t=1 is now part of the equilibrium: the precisions of private and public information
in any period t ≥ 2 depend on whether an attack occurred in the previous period.
As for the structure of equilibrium dynamics, the novelty is that the upward shift in posterior
beliefs caused by an unsuccessful attack may now be diluted by the information about θ conveyed
by the size of the attack. This in turn may lead to situations where new attacks become possible
immediately after unsuccessful ones, even without any exogenous arrival of information. As a result,
equilibrium dynamics may now feature snow-balling eﬀects reminiscent of the ones highlighted in
herding models of crises (e.g., Chari and Kehoe, 2003).
5.3 Observable shocks: changes in fundamentals as a source of dynamics
In this section we introduce shocks to the sustainability of the regime. In particular, we modify the
benchmark model as follows. The regime is abandoned in period t if and only if At ≥ h(θ,δωt).
The variable θ continues to represent the “strength of the status quo”, while ωt is an exogenous
disturbance, independent of θ and i.i.d. over time, with absolutely continuous c.d.f. F and support
R. The scalar δ > 0 parameterizes the volatility of these disturbances. Finally, for simplicity, the
function h is assumed to be linear, with h(θ,δωt) = θ + δωt. We denote this game with Γ(δ),
nesting the baseline model as δ = 0.
We assume here that ωt is publicly observable, which may be relevant for some applications of
interest. In the case of currency attacks, for example, θ may represent the “type” of the central
banker, whereas ωt may capture the role of interest rates, ﬁnancial prices, and other macroeconomic
variables that are readily observable by economic agents and that may aﬀect the willingness or
ability of the central banker to defend the peg.16
As we show below, observable shocks are easy to incorporate in the analysis, because they
aﬀect equilibrium dynamics without introducing any noise in the learning about θ. The exercise
here is thus useful not only for applications, but also for separating the role of shocks as drivers of
equilibrium dynamics from their role as additional sources of noise in learning.
Equilibrium characterization. Since the shocks are observable, the strategy of the agents in
period t is contingent on both xt and ωt ≡ {ω1,...,ωt}. Accordingly, the regime outcome in period










t=1 such that an agent attacks in period t if and only if xt < x∗  
ωt 










+ δωt < 0, it is dominant for agents with suﬃciently low xt to attack. Otherwise,
16We could have allowed for shocks in the opportunity cost of attacking by letting c depend on ωt; we omitted this
possibility only for expositional simplicity.
20the structure of equilibria, and the algorithm for constructing them, is similar to the one in the
benchmark model.
Proposition 4 In the game with shocks, {at ( )}∞
t=1 is a monotone equilibrium if and only if there



















(ii) for t = 1, U (θ∗
1 (ω1) + δω1,−∞;β1,α,z + δω1) = 0 and x∗
1 (ω1)+δω1 = X(θ∗
t (ω1)+δω1;β1)








































This result can be understood as follows. While the critical size of attack that is necessary for
regime change is constant in the benchmark model, here it varies over time as a consequence of
shocks. However, since shocks are observable, the structure of beliefs remains the same apart from
a “change of variables” in the following sense. Let ht ≡ θ + δωt be the critical size for period t,
x′
t ≡ xt + δωt, and z′









is equivalent to the




+δωt. It follows that the net payoﬀ from attacking for the marginal










+ δωt;βt,α,z + δωt
 
. The result then follows from
the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2.
Multiplicity and dynamics. Interesting new eﬀects can emerge because of the interaction
of information and shocks. The equilibrium dynamics again feature phases of tranquility, where an
attack is impossible, and phases of distress, where an attack is possible but does not necessarily
take place. However, shocks provide a second channel through which a transition from one phase
to another can occur. In particular, a transition from distress to tranquility may now be triggered
either by an unsuccessful attack, or by an improvement in fundamentals (a positive ωt); and a
transition from tranquility to distress can be caused either by the arrival of new private information,
or by a deterioration in fundamentals. What is more, the economy can now enter a phase where an
attack is inevitable—a scenario that was impossible in the benchmark model, but becomes possible
here because suﬃciently bad shocks re-introduce a lower dominance region.17
If the benchmark game Γ(0) admits multiple equilibria, then the game with shocks Γ(δ) also
admits multiple equilibria, no matter δ; to see this, it suﬃces to consider realizations of ωt close
enough to zero. Moreover, since the impact of shocks on the conditions that characterize the
equilibrium dynamics clearly vanishes as δ → 0, the following equilibrium convergence result holds:
for any T > 0, any ε > 0, and any equilibrium {x∗
t,θ∗
t} of the benchmark game Γ(0), there exists
17Another diﬀerence is that not attacking becomes dominant for suﬃciently high ωt no matter xt, whereas in the
benchmark model not attacking is at most iteratively dominant for suﬃciently low xt. This, however, makes little
diﬀerence in terms of observable dynamics.
21a ˆ δ > 0 such that for all δ < ˆ δ the game Γ(δ) admits an equilibrium {xδ
t(ωt),θδ
t(ωt)} such that the





t| < ε for all t ≤ T is higher than 1 − ε.18
None of these results, however, should be surprising given that shocks do not interfere with
the learning process. Indeed, what is important for the results of this section is not the absence of
uncertainty about these shocks, but the fact that the shocks do not introduce noise in learning.
To see this, consider the case that ωt is unobservable in period t but becomes commonly
known at the beginning of period t + 1. Then agents face additional uncertainty about the regime
outcome—indeed, the regime outcome would remain uncertain even if agents had known θ—but
the knowledge that the regime has survived past attacks still translates into common certainty that
θ is above a certain threshold. That is, the form of learning remains as sharp as in the benchmark
model. Not surprisingly then, the equilibrium convergence result described above extends to this
case as well.19
We conclude that with respect to robustness the question of interest is whether equilibrium
convergence obtains in situations where shocks also introduce noise in learning. To examine this
question, we next turn to the case that ωt remains unobservable in all periods.
5.4 Unobservable shocks: noisy learning
We now modify the game with shocks examined in the previous section by letting ωt be unob-
servable. The unobservability of shocks “noises up” the learning process and ensures that the
updating of beliefs caused by the knowledge that the regime is still in place never takes the form
of a truncation—agents’ posteriors have full support in R in all periods. The case of unobservable
shocks that we examine in this section is therefore most signiﬁcant from a theoretical perspective.
Below we ﬁrst explain how unobservable shocks aﬀect the algorithm for the construction of
equilibria. We then show how the equilibria in the benchmark model can be approximated ar-
bitrarily well by equilibria of the perturbed game as δ → 0. It follows that the key qualitative
properties of the equilibrium dynamics identiﬁed in the benchmark model—the multiplicity and
the succession of phases of tranquility and distress—extend to the case with unobservable shocks
provided that the volatility of these shocks is small enough and that we reinterpret a phase of
tranquility as one where at most an (arbitrarily) small attack is possible.
Equilibrium characterization. Because ωt aﬀects the regime outcome and is unobserved,
the ability to characterize the set of monotone equilibria in terms of a sequence of truncation points
for θ is lost. Nevertheless, as long as private information can be summarized by a suﬃcient statistic
xt ∈ R, we can still characterize monotone equilibria as sequences of thresholds {x∗
t}∞
t=1 such that
an agent attacks in period t if and only if xt ≤ x∗
t, where x∗
t ∈ R.
To see this, consider an arbitrary monotone strategy, indexed by {¯ xt}∞
t=1, such that an agent
attacks in period t if and only if xt < ¯ xt. Given this strategy, the size of the attack in period t
18This result is proved in the online Supplementary Material.
19This case is also examined in the online Supplementary Material.
22is At (θ) = Φ
 √
βt (¯ xt − θ)
 
, and hence the status quo is abandoned in that period if and only if
ωt ≤ ¯ ωδ
t (θ; ¯ xt), where
¯ ωδ











It follows that the probability of regime change in period t conditional on θ is
pδ
t (θ; ¯ xt) = F(¯ ωδ
t (θ; ¯ xt)).
Next, consider the learning induced when the strategy {¯ xt}∞




θ; ¯ xt−1 
denote the density of the common posterior about θ, when in previous periods agents
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s=1 [1 − pδ







α(θ − z)) is the density of the initial prior. When δ = 0, the above reduces to
a truncated Normal distribution, with truncation point ¯ θt−1
 
¯ xt−1 
≡ min{θ : θ ≥ Φ
 √
βτ (¯ xτ − θ)
 
∀τ ≤ t − 1}. When instead δ > 0, learning is “smoother” in the sense that ψδ
t
 
θ; ¯ xt−1 
is strictly
positive and continuous over the entire real line.





x; ¯ xt 
denote the net
expected payoﬀ from attacking in period t for an agent with suﬃcient statistics x when all other
agents attack in period τ ≤ t if and only if their suﬃcient statistic in τ is less than or equal to ¯ xτ.









t (θ; ¯ x)ψδ
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θ|x; ¯ xt−1 
denotes the density of the private posterior in period t. (The latter are com-
puted applying Bayes’ rule to the common posteriors described above.) Note that vδ
t
 
x; ¯ xt 
depends
on both the contemporaneous threshold ¯ xt and the sequence of past thresholds ¯ xt−1; the former
determines the probability of regime change conditional on θ, whereas the latter determines the













x; ¯ xt 




¯ xt; ¯ xt 




x; ¯ xt 
if ¯ xt = −∞
(11)
Vt is the analogue of the function U in the benchmark model: it represents the net payoﬀ from
attacking in period t for the marginal agent with threshold ¯ xt.




is continuous in ¯ xt for
any ¯ xt ∈ R
t−1 × R, which we use to establish the existence, and complete the characterization, of
monotone equilibria.
23Proposition 5 For any δ > 0, {at ( )}∞
t=1 is a monotone equilibrium for Γ(δ) if and only if there




(i) for all t, at ( ) = 1 if xt < x∗
t and at ( ) = 0 if xt > x∗
t;
(ii) for t = 1, x∗
1 ∈ R and V δ
1 (x∗
1) = 0;
(iii) for any t ≥ 2, either x∗




≤ 0, or x∗





A monotone equilibrium exists for any δ > 0.
The equilibrium algorithm provided above clearly applies also to δ = 0 and is similar to the
one in Proposition 2: start with t = 1 and let x∗
1 be the unique solution to V δ
1 (x∗
1) = 0; proceed to
period t = 2 and either let x∗
2 = −∞ if V δ
2 (x∗
1,−∞) ≤ 0, or let x∗




repeat for any t ≥ 3. The diﬀerence is that here at each step t we need to keep track of the entire
sequence of past thresholds x∗t−1, while in the algorithm of Proposition 2 the impact of x∗t−1 on
period-t beliefs was summarized by θ∗
t−1.
Multiplicity and dynamics. As δ → 0, the dependence of the regime outcome on the shock
ωt vanishes. By implication, the posteriors in any period t ≥ 2 converge pointwise to truncated
Normals as in the benchmark model. The pointwise convergence of pδ
t and ψδ
t in turn implies
pointwise convergence of the payoﬀ of the marginal agent: for t = 1 and any ¯ x1, V δ
1 (¯ x1) →
V 0
1 (¯ x1) ≡ U
 ¯ θ1 (¯ x1),−∞,β1,α,z
 
















Pointwise convergence of payoﬀs, however, can fail for t ≥ 2 at ¯ xt = −∞. To see why, note that,
in the presence of shocks, an agent with suﬃciently low xt may attach probability higher than c to
regime change in period t ≥ 2 even if he expects no other agent to attack in that period. When
this is the case, a positive measure of agents may attack in every period in the perturbed game,
unlike the benchmark model.
Nevertheless, the pointwise convergence of V δ
t (¯ xt) for any ¯ xt > −∞ ensures that this dominance
region vanishes as δ → 0. It also ensures that whenever V 0
t (¯ xt) has an intersection with the
horizontal axis, V δ
t (¯ xt) also has a nearby intersection for δ > 0 small enough. These properties
together imply that any equilibrium in the benchmark game can be approximated arbitrarily well
by an equilibrium in the perturbed game, except for knife-edge cases where V 0
t (or equivalently U)
is tangent to the horizontal axis instead of intersecting it.
Theorem 3 For any ε > 0 and any T < ∞, there exists δ (ε,T) > 0 such that the following is
true for all δ < δ (ε,T):
For any equilibrium {x∗
t}∞
t=1 of Γ(0) such that x∗





for all t ∈ {2,...,T},
there exists an equilibrium {xδ
t}∞
t=1 of Γ(δ) such that, for all t ≤ T, either |x∗
t − xδ
t| < ε, or
x∗
t = −∞and xδ
t < −1/ε.
The result is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 for an example where T = 2 and where Γ(0) admits









Figure 4: Payoﬀ of marginal agent with and without shocks.
period 2 generated by equilibrium play in period 1 in the game without shocks (δ = 0). This is
simply the initial prior truncated at θ∗
1 = ¯ θ1 (x∗
1), where x∗
1 is the unique solution to V 0
1 (x∗
1) = 0
(or equivalently where θ∗
1 is the unique solution to U (θ∗
1,−∞,β1,α,z) = 0). The other two lines
represent the equilibrium common posteriors ψδ
2(θ;xδ
1) for the game with shocks (δ > 0), where
xδ
1 is the unique solution to V δ
1 (xδ
1) = 0; the dotted line corresponds to a relatively high δ and
the dashed one to a low δ. Since the support of ωt is the entire real line, the probability of regime
change is less than 1 for any θ and therefore ψδ
2 assigns positive probability to all θ. However, as δ
becomes smaller, xδ
1 converges to x∗
1 and the probability of regime change converges to 1 for θ < θ∗
1
and to 0 for θ > θ∗
1. By implication, the smooth common posterior of the perturbed game in period
2 converges to the truncated one of the benchmark model.
25In Figure 4, the solid line represents the payoﬀ V 0
2 (x∗
1,x2) of the marginal agent in period 2
for δ = 0, whereas the other two lines represent V δ
2 (xδ
1,x2) for δ > 0.20 Note that, for x2 small
enough, V 0
2 is negative but V δ
2 is positive, which implies that nobody attacking in period 2 is
part of an equilibrium in the benchmark model but not in the game with shocks.21 Moreover,
when δ is high (dotted line), V δ
2 is monotonic in x2 and therefore has a single intersection with
the horizontal line, in which case the equilibrium would be unique if the game ended in period 2.
When, instead, δ is suﬃciently small (dashed line), V δ
2 is non-monotonic and has three intersections,
which correspond to three diﬀerent equilibria for the two-period game with shocks. Finally, the
middle and the highest intersections approximate the two intersections of the solid line, while the
lowest intersection is arbitrarily small, thus approximating x∗
2 = −∞. Along with the fact that xδ
1
converges to x∗
1, this implies that any equilibrium of the two-period game without shocks can be
approximated by an equilibrium of the perturbed game.
At the same time, it is important to recognize that uniqueness is ensured in the alternative
limit as β2 → ∞ for given δ > 0. To see this, note that, for any given δ > 0, the common posterior
in period 2 has a strictly positive density over the entire real line, and hence over a connected set
of θ that includes both dominance regions (θ < 0 and θ > 1). This in turn ensures that standard
global-game uniqueness results apply: uniqueness necessarily obtains in the limit as the noise in
private information vanishes (see Proposition 2.2 in Morris and Shin, 2003).
However, away from this limit, the impact of private information here is quite diﬀerent from
that in the static Gaussian benchmark (Section 2.1). There, private information always contributes
toward uniqueness.22 Here, instead, it can have a non-monotonic eﬀect on the determinacy of
equilibria: for δ small enough, in period 2 uniqueness obtains for β2 either close to β1 or close to
∞, while multiplicity obtains for intermediate β2.
This non-monotonic eﬀect of private information in our game highlights the interaction of
private information with equilibrium learning. On the one hand, more precise private information
increases strategic uncertainty as in the static game; on the other, it dilutes the upward shift in
posterior beliefs caused by the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks. Whereas the ﬁrst
eﬀect contributes to uniqueness, the second can contribute to multiplicity in a similar fashion as in
the benchmark game without shocks.
In conclusion, what sustains multiplicity in the dynamic game is the property that the knowl-
edge that the regime survived attacks in the past provides relevant common information about
20In order to illustrate V
δ








against f (x2) rather than x2, where
f is a strictly increasing function that maps R onto a bounded interval (e.g., f = Φ).
21In the example discussed here, an agent ﬁnds it dominant to attack in period 2 for suﬃciently low x2. However,
this need not be the case if ωt had a bounded support and δ were small enough.
22This is true in two senses. First, a higher β makes it more likely that the economy satisﬁes β ≥ α
2/(2π) in
which case the equilibrium is unique. Second, whenever β < α
2/(2π) the range of z for which (1) and (2) admit
multiple solutions shrinks with β, and the distance between the largest and the smallest solutions for any given z
also diminishes with β.
26the strength of the status quo in the present. That this knowledge resulted in posterior beliefs
that assign zero measure to suﬃciently low θ in the benchmark model is not essential. What is
important is that the eﬀect of this information on posterior beliefs is not diluted too much either
by a signiﬁcant change in fundamentals (suﬃciently high δ) or by a signiﬁcant increase in strategic
uncertainty (suﬃciently high β).
5.5 Private information about shocks: long- versus short-lived agents
In the environments examined above, agents had no private information about the innovations in
fundamentals. Relaxing this assumption may compromise tractability by removing the ability to
summarize the history of private information with a one-dimensional suﬃcient statistic.
To see this, consider the following variation of the game with shocks. Let ht denote again
the critical size of attack that triggers regime change in period t and assume that {ht} are jointly
Normal with non-zero correlation across time. To simplify, think of ht following a Gaussian random
walk: h1 = θ ∼ N(z,1/α) and ht = ht−1 + δωt for t ≥ 2, with ωt ∼ N(0,1) being i.i.d. across
time and independent of θ.23 Next, let the private signals agents receive in period t be ˜ xt = ht +ξt,
where ξt is i.i.d. across agents and time, and independent of hs for any s.
Consider ﬁrst t = 1. Equilibrium play is the same as in the static benchmark: there exist
thresholds x∗
1 and h∗
1 such that an agent attacks if and only if ˜ x1 ≤ x∗
1 and the status quo is
abandoned if and only if h1 ≤ h∗
1. Consider next t = 2. The posterior beliefs about h2 given the
private signals ˜ x1 and ˜ x2 alone are Normal with mean x2 ≡ λ0 + λ1˜ x1 + λ2˜ x2 and variance σ2
2, for
some coeﬃcients (λ0,λ1,λ2,σ2). This may suggest that x2 can be used as a suﬃcient statistic for
(˜ x1, ˜ x2) with respect to h2. However, the posterior beliefs about h2 conditional also on the event
that h1 > h∗
1 are not invariant in (˜ x1, ˜ x2) for given x2; the problem is that x2 is not a suﬃcient
statistic for (˜ x1, ˜ x2) with respect to h1. Thus, private information cannot be summarized in x2 and
equilibrium play in period 2 is characterized by a function Y2 : R2 → R such that an agent attacks
if and only if Y2 (˜ x1, ˜ x2) ≤ 0 (and a corresponding function Q2 : R2 → R such that regime change
occurs if and only if Q2 (h1,h2) ≤ 0). Similarly, equilibrium play in any period t ≥ 2 is characterized
by a function Yt : Rt → R such that at
 
˜ xt 




Contrast this with the formalization in the previous section. There, in each period, we had to
solve an equation where the unknown was a real variable ¯ xt ∈ R. Here, instead, we need to solve
each period a functional equation where the unknown is a function Yt with domain Rt—a function
whose dimensionality explodes with t. Clearly, this is far less tractable, if at all feasible.
Moreover, it is not clear if this alternative formalization brings any substantial gain from a
theoretical perspective. Both formalizations ensure that the critical size of attack ht (and hence
the payoﬀ structure) may change over time, that agents have asymmetric information about ht
23Note that this is the same as ht = θ +δ˜ ωt, where ˜ ωt ≡ ω1 +...+ωt; that is, the same as in the game with shocks
in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, but with the shocks correlated across time. Such correlation was not allowed in Sections 5.3
and 5.4, but this was only for simplicity.
27in each period, and that the common posterior about ht is continuous over a connected set that
includes both ht < 0 and ht > 1 (and hence that dominance regions are possible for both actions).
In these respects, they both seem appropriate extensions of global games to a dynamic setting.24
Nevertheless, this second formalization may be more appropriate for certain applications. One
way then to restore tractability is to assume that agents are short-lived. In particular, consider the
game described above, in which ht follows a Gaussian random walk, with the following modiﬁcation.
As long as the status quo is in place, a new cohort of agents replaces the old one in each period.
Each cohort is of measure 1 and lives exactly one period. Agents who are born in period t receive
private signals xt = ht + ξt, where ξt is Normal noise with precision βt, i.i.d. across agents and
independent of hs for any s ≤ t.
Given that ht is correlated across time, the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks is
informative about the strength of the regime in the present, as in the case with long-lived agents.
But unlike that case, agents playing in period t have no private information other than xt. Together
with the fact that ht alone pins down the cross-sectional distribution of xt, this property ensures
that monotone equilibria can again be characterized by sequences {x∗
t,h∗
t}∞
t=1 such that in period
t an agent attacks if and only if xt < x∗
t and the status quo is abandoned if and only if ht < h∗
t.




ht; ¯ xt−1 
denote the c.d.f. of the common posterior in period t about ht, when agents in earlier
cohorts attacked in periods τ ≤ t − 1 if and only if xτ < ¯ xτ. When earlier cohorts followed such
strategies, the status quo survived period τ if and only if hτ > ¯ θτ (¯ xτ), where ¯ θτ (¯ xτ) is the solution
to Φ
 √
βτ (¯ xτ − hτ)
 
= hτ. Therefore, for any t ≥ 2, Ψδ
t
 
ht; ¯ xt−1 




ht; ¯ xt−1 
=
  +∞








ht−1; ¯ xt−2 
1 − Ψδ
t−1
 ¯ θt−1 (¯ xt−1); ¯ xt−2  (12)
with Ψδ
1 (h1) = Φ(
√
α(h1 − z)). Next, let Ψδ
t
 
ht|x; ¯ xt−1 
denote the c.d.f. of private posteriors
about ht; this is obtained by applying Bayes’ rule to (12). Then, the expected net payoﬀ from
attacking in period t for an agent with signal x is vδ
1 (x; ¯ x1) = Ψδ
1
 ¯ θ1 (¯ x1)|x
 




x; ¯ xt 
= Ψδ
t
 ¯ θt (¯ xt)|x; ¯ xt−1 
− c
for t ≥ 2. Finally, let V δ
t denote the payoﬀ of the marginal agent, as deﬁned in condition (11)) but
using the function vδ
t above. With V δ
t deﬁned this way, the equilibrium algorithm of Proposition
5 applies to the environment examined here as well. What is more, because beliefs—and hence
payoﬀs—again converge to their counterparts in the benchmark game as δ → 0, Theorem 3 also
applies. (See the Supplementary Material for details.)
The game with short-lived agents thus permits one to examine environments where agents have
private information about the innovations in fundamentals while maintaining tractability.
24Note that global-game results do not require that agents have private information about all payoﬀ-relevant
variables, nor that uncertainty vanishes in the limit for all payoﬀ-relevant variables.
286 Conclusion
This paper examined how learning inﬂuences the dynamics of coordination in a global game of
regime change. Our results struck a delicate balance between the earlier common-knowledge and
the more recent global-games literature: the dynamics featured both a reﬁned role for multiplicity
and a certain discontinuity of outcomes with respect to changes in information or payoﬀs. They
also led to novel predictions, such as the possibility that fundamentals predict eventual outcomes
but not the timing and number of attacks, or that dynamics alternate between phases of tranquility,
during which agents accumulate information and no attacks are possible, and phases of distress,
during which attacks may occur but do no necessarily take place.
From a methodological perspective, our results oﬀer two lessons with regard to the recent
debate about uniqueness versus multiplicity in coordination environments. First, that equilibrium
learning can be a natural source of multiplicity in a dynamic setting, despite the heterogeneity of
beliefs. Second, and most importantly, that this debate may dilute what, at least in our view, is the
central contribution of the global-games approach: the understanding of how the structure of beliefs
can lead to interesting and novel predictions about equilibrium behavior well beyond equilibrium
determinacy.
From an applied perspective, on the other hand, the predictions we derived may help understand
the dynamics of currency attacks, ﬁnancial crashes, political change, and other crises phenomena.
With this in mind, in Section 5 we sought to give some guidance on how the analysis can be extended
to accommodate certain features that were absent in the benchmark model but may be important
for applications. The scope of these extensions, however, was limited to changes in information
or in fundamentals—we remained silent about other dynamic eﬀects (such as those introduced by
irreversible actions or liquidity constraints), as well as about the role of large players (such as that
of a “Soros” or a policy maker). Extending the analysis in these directions seems a promising line
for future research.
29Appendix: proofs omitted in the main text
Proof of Proposition 1. Solving (1) for ˆ x gives ˆ x = ˆ θ + β−1/2Φ−1(ˆ θ). Substituting this into
(2) gives a single equation in ˆ θ :
Ust(ˆ θ;β,α,z) = 0, (13)
where





Φ−1 (θ) + α √
β (z − θ)
  
− c. (14)
Note that Ust (θ; ) is continuous and diﬀerentiable in θ ∈ (0,1), with limθ→0 Ust (θ) = 1 − c > 0











Φ−1 (θ) + α √
β (z − θ)
   
1












2π, the condition β ≥ α2/(2π) is both necessary and suﬃcient
for Ust to be monotonic in θ, in which case the monotone equilibrium is unique. Finally, for
the proof that only this equilibrium survives iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, see
Morris and Shin (2001, 2003).
Proof of Proposition 2. Necessity follows from the arguments in the main text. For suﬃ-
ciency, take any sequence {x∗
t,θ∗
t}∞
t=1that satisﬁes conditions (ii) and (iii); let θ∗
0 = −∞; suppose
all other agents follow strategies as in (i), in which case Rt = 0 if and only if θ > θ∗
t−1, for all t ≥ 1;
and consider the best response for an individual agent. If θ∗
t = θ∗
t−1, in which case t ≥ 2, θ∗
t−1 > 0
and x∗






= 0 for all xt and therefore
not attacking is indeed optimal. If instead θ∗
t > θ∗








t = X (θ∗
t,βt), then, by the monotonicity of the private posterior in xt and the deﬁnitions of X( )












if and only if xt ≤ (≥)X (θ∗
t,βt)
and therefore it is indeed optimal to attack for xt < x∗
t and not to attack for xt > x∗
t.
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￿ − c if max{0,θ∗
−1} < θ∗ < 1
−c if θ∗ ≤ θ∗
−1 or θ∗ = 1 > θ∗
−1
Part (i) follows by inspecting U.





< U (θ∗,−∞,βt,α,z) for all θ∗ (since θ∗
t−1 > −∞) and






< 0 for all θ∗ ≥   θt, which gives the result.
For (iii), take any θ∗
t−1 > θ∞. Note that for all θ∗ ∈ [θ∗
t−1,1], limβ→∞ U (θ∗,−∞,β,α,z) =
θ∞ − θ∗ < 0. Since U (θ∗,−∞,β,α,z) is continuous in θ∗ and [θ∗
t−1,1] is compact, it follows that













< U (θ∗,−∞,β,α,z) for
θ∗ > θ∗





< 0 for all θ∗ and therefore (8) admits
no solution.
For (iv), take any θ∗





= θ∞ − θ∗ > 0 for any θ∗ ∈
(θ∗






















follows then that (8) admits a solution for βt > β.
Finally, consider (v). Fix t ≥ 2, θ∗
t−2, βt−1, α, and z (where we use the convention θ∗
0 =
−∞) and suppose that θ∗






< 0 for all θ∗ > θ∗
t−1. This, together with the properties that U (θ∗,θ−1,β,α,z)
is non-increasing in θ−1, continuous in θ∗, and equal to −c for θ∗ ≤ θ−1, implies that there exists





< −∆ for all θ∗ ∈ [0,1]. Furthermore, by continuity of U in
(θ∗,β), there exists β > βt−1 such that U (θ∗, ,β, ) is uniformly continuous over [0,1] × [βt−1,β].





< 0 for all β ∈ [βt−1,β)
and all θ∗ ∈ [0,1], which proves that condition (8) admits no solution in any period τ > t for which
βτ < β.
Lemma A1 There exist thresholds z ≤ z ≤ z such that: ˆ θt ≤ ˆ θ1 for all t if z ≤ z; ˆ θ1 ≤ (≥)θ∞ if
and only z ≥ (≤)z; and ˆ θt < θ∞ for all t if and only if z > z. These thresholds satisfy z = z = z
when c ≤ 1/2 and z ≤ z < z when c > 1/2.




, let ˆ θ = ˆ θ(β,α,z) be the unique solution to the equation
U(ˆ θ,−∞,β,α,z) = 0 (i.e., the static equilibrium threshold) and













The threshold ˜ z (β,α) is deﬁned by U(θ∞,−∞,β,α, ˜ z (β,α)) = 0 and is such that ˆ θ ≥ (≤)θ∞ if
and only if z ≤ (≥) ˜ z. The threshold ˆ z (β,α), on the other hand, is deﬁned so that ∂ˆ θ/∂β ≥ (≤)0
if and only if z ≥ (≤) ˆ z. To simplify notation, we henceforth suppress the dependence of ˆ θ on (α,z)
and of ˜ z and ˆ z on α.
First, consider c = 1/2, in which case ˆ z (β) = ˜ z (β) = 1/2 for all β. When z < 1/2, ˆ θ (β) > θ∞
and ∂ˆ θ/∂β < 0 for all β ≥ β1 and therefore ˆ θ1 ≥ ˆ θt > θ∞ for all t. When instead z = 1/2,
ˆ θ(β) = θ∞ for any β ≥ β1, and therefore ˆ θ1 = ˆ θt = θ∞ for all t. Finally, when z > 1/2, for any
β ≥ β1, ˆ θ(β) < θ∞ and ∂ˆ θ/∂β > 0, and hence ˆ θ1 ≤ ˆ θt < θ∞ for all t. The result thus holds with
z = z = z = 1/2.
Next, consider c < 1/2, in which case ˜ z (β) and ˆ z (β) are both decreasing in β, satisfy ˆ z (β) >
˜ z (β) > θ∞ for all β, and converge to θ∞ as β → ∞. When z ≤ θ∞, then clearly z < ˜ z (β) < ˆ z (β)
31for all β and therefore ˆ θ(β) is always higher than θ∞ and decreasing in β, which implies that
ˆ θ1 ≥ ˆ θt > θ∞ for all t. When z ∈ (θ∞, ˜ z (β1)), there are β′′ > β′ > β1 such that ˜ z (β′) = ˆ z (β′′) = z.
For β ∈ [β1,β′), ˆ θ (β) is higher than θ∞ and decreases with β. As soon as β ∈ (β′,β′′), ˆ θ(β) becomes
lower than θ∞ and continues to decrease with β. Once β ≥ β′′, ˆ θ(β) starts increasing with β, but
never exceeds θ∞. Hence, ˆ θ1 > θ∞ and ˆ θ1 ≥ ˆ θt for all t. When z = ˜ z (β1), ˆ θ1 = θ∞ ≥ ˆ θt for all t.
Finally, when z > ˜ z (β1), ˆ θ (β) < θ∞ for all β, and therefore ˆ θt < θ∞ for all t. We conclude that
the result holds for c < 1/2 with z = z = z = ˜ z (β1).
Finally, consider c > 1/2, in which case ˆ z (β) and ˜ z (β) are both increasing in β, satisfy
ˆ z (β) < ˜ z (β) < θ∞, and converge to θ∞ as β → ∞.When z ≤ ˆ z (β1), then clearly z < ˆ z (β) < ˜ z (β)
for all β > β1 and therefore ˆ θ(β) is always higher than θ∞ and decreasing in β, which implies that
ˆ θ1 ≥ ˆ θt > θ∞ for all t. When z ∈ (ˆ z (β1), ˜ z (β1)), there is β′ > β1 such ˆ z (β′) = z. For β ∈ (β1,β′),
ˆ θ(β) is higher than θ∞ and increasing in β, whereas for β > β′, ˆ θ(β) decreases with β, converging to
θ∞ from above. It follows that maxt≥1 ˆ θt ≥ ˆ θ1 > θ∞. When z = ˜ z (β1), maxt≥1 ˆ θt ≥ ˆ θ1 = θ∞. When
z ∈ (˜ z (β1),θ∞), there are β′′ > β′ > β1 such that ˜ z (β′) = ˆ z (β′′) = z. For β ∈ (β1,β′), ˆ θ(β) is lower
than θ∞ and increasing in β. For β ∈ (β′,β′′), ˆ θ(β) is higher than θ∞ and increases with β. And
for β > β′′, ˆ θ(β) decreases with β and asymptotes to θ∞ from above. Hence, maxt≥1 ˆ θt > θ∞ > ˆ θ1.
Finally, when z ≥ θ∞, then clearly z > ˜ z (β) > ˆ z (β) for all β and therefore ˆ θ (β) is always lower
than θ∞, increases with β, and asymptotes θ∞ from below. Hence, ˆ θ1 ≤ ˆ θt < θ∞ for all t. We
conclude that the result holds for c > 1/2 with z = ˆ z (β1), z = ˜ z (β1), and z = θ∞.
Proof of Proposition 3. Apart from a notational adjustment – namely the dependence of
U in period t on (αt,zt)and of (x∗
t,θ∗
t) on zt – the proof follows exactly the same steps as in the
model with only private information, and is thus omitted for brevity.
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider ﬁrst t = 1. For any (β1,α1,z1), U (θ∗,−∞,β1,α1,z1) is
continuous in θ∗ ∈ [0,1] with U (0,−∞, ) = 1 − c and U (1,−∞, ) = −c. Hence a solution
θ∗
1(z1) to U (θ∗
1,−∞,β1,α1,z1) = 0 always exists.25 Next, consider any t ≥ 2 and note that,
for any (θ∗






is strictly decreasing in zt and
U (θ∗, ,zt) → 1 − c > 0 as zt → −∞, implying that necessarily maxθ∗∈[θ−1,1] U (θ∗, ,zt) > 0
for zt suﬃciently low. Furthermore, since U (θ∗, ,zt) is continuous in θ∗ ∈ [θ∗






→ −c monotonically for any θ∗ ∈ [θ∗
t−1,1] as zt → +∞, from stan-





converges uniformly to −c





< 0 for zt suﬃciently high. The
















, which also implies
that (9) admits a solution θ∗
t(zt) > θ∗






25Note that the function θ
∗
1(·) is unique if and only if β1 ≥ α
2
1/2π. Hence for β1 < α
2
1/2π, the game trivially admits
multiple equilibria even if T = 1.
32is then an equilibrium: for t = 1, θ∗
1(z1) is any solution to U (θ∗
1,−∞,β1,α1,z1) = 0; for all







= 0}. Note that, in this
equilibrium, at any t ≥ 2, θ∗
t(zt) > θ∗











all zt and all t is also an equilibrium, we conclude that the game admits multiple equilibria for any
{βt,αt}
T
t=1 and any T ≥ 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. Parts (i) and (ii) are immediate. For part (iii), note that in each






















, for otherwise the posterior probability
of regime change would be zero for any xt and attacking would never be optimal; moreover, it must



























































t (ωt) + α
βt+αz − θ∗
t−1 (ωt−1)
   = c.









+ δωt;βt) − δωt and (10). And conversely, if (10) admits a solution, then
there exists an equilibrium with an attack in period t. This establishes the ﬁrst half of part (iii).








+ δωt ≥ 0, for otherwise it




+ δωt ≥ 0 ensures that
there is an equilibrium in which no attack takes place in period t. This establishes the second half
of part (iii).
Lemma A2 For t = 1, V δ





continuous in ¯ xt for any ¯ xt ∈ R
t−1
× R.26
Proof. Consider ﬁrst δ = 0, in which case V 0
1 (¯ x1) ≡ U













for t ≥ 2. Note that, for all t, ¯ θt
 
¯ xt 
≡ min{θ : θ ≥ Φ(
√
βτ (¯ xτ − θ))
∀τ ≤ t} is continuous in ¯ xt ∈ R
t
and takes values in [0,1]. Furthermore, U (θ,−∞,β,α,z) is
26Continuity can be extended in R
t
as follows. For any function f : A → R, where A ⊆ R
t
and t ≥ 1, we say that
f is continuous over A if and only if, for any x
t ∈ A and any ε > 0, there exists η > 0 such that, for any ˜ x
t ∈ A such
that for all τ ≤ t: (a) |˜ xτ − xτ| < η if xτ ∈ R; (b) ˜ xτ < −1/η if xτ = −∞; (c) ˜ xτ > 1/η, if xτ = +∞, the following










































, and f (A) × g (B) ⊆ C ⊆ R
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continuous in A × B.
33continuous in θ ∈ [0,1] and U (θ,θ−1,β,α,z) is continuous in (θ,θ−1) ∈ [0,1]2. It follows that, for




is continuous in R
t
.
Consider next δ > 0. For all t ≥ 1, the function pδ











continuous in θ ∈ R and ¯ xt ∈ R; increasing in ¯ xt, and decreasing in θ; it is bounded in [0,1]; and it
satisﬁes limθ→∞ pδ
t (θ; ¯ xt) = 0 and limθ→−∞ pδ
t (θ; ¯ xt) = 1 for any ¯ xt ∈ R. The p.d.f. of the private
posteriors for t = 1, ψδ








, is clearly continuous in θ ∈ R and
x ∈ R; and similarly for the c.d.f. Ψδ
1. It follows that v1 (x; ¯ x1) =
  +∞
−∞ pδ
1 (θ; ¯ x1)dΨ1 (θ|x) − c is

















βt (x − θ′)
 
ψδ


















s=1 [1 − pδ










which is also continuous in θ ∈ R and (x, ¯ xt−1) ∈ R×R
t−1; and similarly for Ψδ
t.27 It follows that
vt
 





t (θ; ¯ xt)dΨδ
t
 
θ|x; ¯ xt−1 
−c is continuous in (x, ¯ xt−1, ¯ xt) ∈ R×R
t. Moreover,
for all t, since pδ
t (θ; ¯ xt) is bounded in [0,1], vδ
t
 
x; ¯ xt 
is bounded in [−c,1 − c]. In addition, since
the distribution of x given θ satisﬁes the MLRP and pδ
t (θ; ¯ xt) is decreasing in θ, by standard
representation theorems (Milgrom, 1981) we have that vδ
t
 
x; ¯ xt 








x; ¯ xt 
exist for any ¯ xt ∈ R
t





deﬁned for ¯ xt = ±∞. Finally, since vδ
t
 
x; ¯ xt−1, ¯ xt
 
is continuous in (x, ¯ xt−1, ¯ xt) ∈ R×R
t−1
×R, it is
immediate that V δ
t
 





¯ xt; ¯ xt−1, ¯ xt
 
is continuous in (¯ xt−1, ¯ xt) ∈ R
t−1×R.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suﬃciency. Consider a sequence {x∗
t}
∞
t=1 that satisﬁes conditions
(ii) and (iii) in the proposition. The monotonicity of vδ
t
 
x; ¯ xt 
with respect to x (see proof








if and only if
x ≤ (≥)x∗
t. It follows that the strategies deﬁned by (i) − (iii) constitute a monotone equilibrium.
Necessity. Conversely, suppose that {at( )}
∞
t=1 is a monotone equilibrium. Since in any such
equilibrium the measure of agents attacking in every period is decreasing in θ, the probability
of regime change is also decreasing in θ. Then, by standard representation theorems (Milgrom,
1981), the expected payoﬀ from attacking is decreasing in xt, implying that agents must follow
cut-oﬀ strategies. For {x∗
t}
∞










≤ 0 if x∗




≥ 0 if x∗
t = +∞.
We next show that, in any equilibrium, x∗
t < +∞ for all t ≥ 1 and x∗
1 > −∞. Indeed, if
x∗
t = +∞, in which case pδ
t (θ;x∗
t) = F ((1 − θ)/δ), then, for any t ≥ 2, (x, ¯ xt−1) ∈ R × R
t−1
, and
27To see this, note that the function q deﬁned by q (p1,...,pt−1,φ) = Π
t−1
s=1 [1 − ps]φ is continuous in [0,1]
t−1 × R,

































































θ|x; ¯ xt−1 
dθ. Furthermore, since the knowledge that the status



























≤ F ((1 − θ′)/δ) − c. Since the latter is true for any
θ′ ∈ R, it is also true for θ′ → +∞, in which case F ((1 − θ′)/δ) → 0. Together with the fact that
vδ









−c < 0 and hence x∗
t = +∞ can not be part of any equilibrium. A similar argument rules out
x∗
1 = +∞. Finally, suppose x∗

























1 (θ|x)dθ, and therefore limx→−∞ vδ
1 (x;−∞) ≥ F ((−θ′)/δ)−c. Since this
is true also for θ′ → −∞, and since vδ
1 is bounded from above by 1 − c, we have that V δ
1 (−∞) =
limx→−∞ vδ
1 (x;−∞) = 1 − c > 0, implying that x∗
1 = −∞ can not be part of an equilibrium.
We conclude that (i) − (iii) necessarily hold in any monotone equilibrium.
Existence. For any δ > 0, the monotonicity of vδ
1 (x; ¯ x1) in ¯ x1 along with its continuity in
x for any ¯ x1 and the fact that limx→−∞ vδ
1 (x,−∞) > 0 > limx→+∞ vδ
1 (x,+∞), implies that there
exist x′,x′′ ∈ R such that V δ
1 (x′) ≥ vδ
1 (x′,−∞) > 0 > vδ
1 (x′′,+∞) ≥ V δ
1 (x′′). The continuity of
V δ
1 (¯ x1) in ¯ x1 then ensures existence of a solution x∗
1 ∈ (x′,x′′) to V δ
1 (x∗
1) = 0.
Next, consider t ≥ 2. For any given ¯ xt−1, a similar argument as above ensures the existence of









< 0. Moreover, either there also exists x′ ∈ R




≥ 0, or V δ
t
 
¯ xt−1, ¯ xt
 




¯ xt−1, ¯ xt
 
in ¯ xt ensures the existence of ¯ xt ∈ (x′,x′′) such that V δ
t
 
¯ xt−1, ¯ xt
 































that satisﬁes conditions (ii) and (iii) in the proposition.
Proof of Theorem 3. We prove the result in four steps. Step 1 uses the structure of beliefs
and payoﬀs to establish that V δ
t converges pointwise to V 0
t as δ → 0. Steps 2 and 3 then use this
pointwise convergence of payoﬀs to prove the result by induction: Step 2 proves that the result




















35holds for T = 1, while Step 3 proves that if the result holds for T′ = T − 1, then it holds also for
T′ = T.
We start by establishing pointwise convergence of V δ
t as δ → 0.




t (θ; ¯ xt) = p0
t (θ; ¯ xt) ≡
 
1 if θ ≤ ¯ θt (¯ xt),
0 if θ > ¯ θt (¯ xt).
(15)
This implies that, for any t ≥ 2, any ¯ xt−1 ∈ R
























α(¯ θt−1(¯ xt−1)−z)) otherwise
(16)
and hence limδ→0 ψδ
t
 
θ|x; ¯ xt−1 
= ψ0
t(θ|x; ¯ xt−1) for any x ∈ R. From (15), it follows that, at t = 1,









1 (θ; ¯ x1)dΨδ
1 (θ|¯ x1) − c
= Ψ0
1








Similarly, by (15) and (16), for any t ≥ 2, any
 

















t (θ; ¯ xt)dΨδ
t
 




 ¯ θt (¯ xt)|¯ xt; ¯ xt−1 
− c
= U








¯ xt−1, ¯ xt
 
.
We next prove the result by induction.





1 − ε) > 0 > V 0
1 (x∗
1 + ε).
By the convergence of V δ
1 to V 0
1 as δ → 0, we can ﬁnd δ1(ε) > 0 such that, for any δ < δ1 (ε),
V δ
1 (x∗
1 − ε) > 0 > V δ
1 (x∗
1 + ε).
From the continuity of V δ
1 (¯ x1) in ¯ x1 for any δ > 0, it follows that there exists a solution xδ
1 to
V δ
1 (x1) = 0 such that x∗
1 −ε < xδ
1 < x∗
1 +ε. Following the same steps as in the proof of existence in
Proposition 5, we can then construct an equilibrium {xδ
t}∞
t=1 for Γ(δ) such that |¯ x1 (δ) − x∗
1| < ε.
This proves the result for T = 1.




the monotonicity of ¯ θ1 (¯ x1) in ¯ x1.
36Step 3. Consider next an arbitrary T ≥ 2, ﬁx ε > 0, and suppose the result holds for T − 1.
We seek to prove that the result holds for T. In doing so, we distinguish two cases: Step 3.a below
considers the case that x∗
T > −∞, whereas Step 3.b considers the case that x∗
T = −∞.
Step 3.a. Take ﬁrst any equilibrium of Γ(0) such that x∗
T > −∞. By the (local) strict monotonic-
ity of V 0
T around x∗
T implied by the assumption that x∗
































. Without loss of generality, assume the ﬁrst







T−1 and the fact that the result holds for T −1, there exists some ε′
T ∈ (0,εT) such that, for any
δ < δ (ε′
T,T − 1), there is a sequence xδ,T−1 satisfying the following three conditions:30
[C1] for all t ≤ T − 1, either xδ




≤ 0, or xδ





[C2] for all t ≤ T − 1, |x∗
t − xδ
t| < ε′
T < ε if x∗
t ∈ R, and xδ
t < −1/ε′
T < −1/ε if x∗
t = −∞;































exists δT ∈ (0,δ (ε′
T,T − 1)) such that, for any δ < δT, there is xδ,T−1 that satisﬁes [C1]-[C2] and
such that:






























Step 3.b. Next, take any equilibrium of Γ(0) such that x∗










maxτ≤t−1 ¯ θτ (x∗
τ). Pick some x′






xT−1 and the fact that the result holds for T − 1, there exists some ε′ ∈ (0,ε) such that, for any
δ < δ (ε′,T − 1)), there is a sequence xδ,T−1 which satisﬁes conditions [C1]-[C2] above (replacing
ε′








By the pointwise convergence of V δ
T to V 0
T, there also exists a δT ∈ (0,δ (ε′,T − 1))) such that, for








If, for the same xδ,T−1, there exists an x′′
T ∈ (−∞,x′






≥ 0, then, by the
30Continuity of V
0 implies existence of ε
′
T such that [C3] holds for any x
δ,T−1 that satisﬁes [C2]; that the result
holds for T − 1 then ensures that, for any δ < δ (ε
′
T,T − 1), there exists x
δ,T−1 that satisﬁes both [C1] and [C2].





in xT ∈ R, there is also an xδ
T ∈ R, with x′′
T < xδ
T < x′





















Finally, recall that (8) admits at most two solutions in every t and therefore the set of xT∗ that
can be part of an equilibrium of Γ(0) is ﬁnite. Hence, there is δ (ε,T) ∈ (0,δ (ε,T − 1)) such that,
for any δ < δ (ε,T) and every equilibrium {x∗
t}∞
t=1 of Γ(0) for which x∗






all t ≤ T, there exists xδ,T such that, for all t ≤ T : if x∗
t ∈ R, then |xδ
t −x∗






t = −∞, then xδ




≤ 0. From the same arguments as for the proof of
existence in Proposition 5, we conclude that xδ,T is part of an equilibrium {xδ
t}∞
t=1 for Γ(δ), which
completes the proof.
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